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 Turkmenistan’s new private farmers: the effect of human capital on 
performance 
 





Almost all former socialist countries are introducing private farming as part of land reform. In countries 
where such farming existed one or two generations ago, land might be restituted to former owners. In 
Turkmenistan, where there had been little private agriculture and no small landowners, land was distributed to 
new beneficiaries. This paper shows that the previous position of the new farm “owners” strongly affected 
what resources they had (land, capital, water) and how effectively they used them. The study is based on a 
survey conducted in 2000 on a sample of 143 farmers from Turkmenistan’s all five administrative regions. 
The farmers were divided for analysis into five categories, according to previous positions (managers, middle-
level specialists, skilled and unskilled workers, and administrative staff). On the average, all categories of 
farmers turned a profit. However, the most successful were the middle-level specialists (agronomists, 
engineers). They had the largest plots, the best land, and the best-equipped farms. Like the managers and the 
administrative staff, they had savings, some of which they used as startup capital. They diversified their 
production more than others, and were better able to obtain credit. Former unskilled workers were the least 
successful, lacking capital, and unable to afford risks, thus growing only wheat and cotton at the expense of 
other crops and of livestock. Earlier studies have shown that former position affected the share of resources 
received by individuals in the ex Soviet Union. In addition to confirming the finding, we have shown that 
former position also affected the use of those resources, and the economic performance of the users. 




The emergence of independent peasant farmers operating outside the traditional collectivist 
frameworks may well have been one the few tangible outcomes of Turkmenistan’s agrarian 
reform. Private farming was allowed in Turkmenistan in February 1993 by a Presidential 
decree that provided for the allocation of farmland to any Turkmen citizen. Priority in 
access to land in each location was given to local residents having agricultural experience 
and appropriate qualifications. Subsequently, the Law on Daikhan (Peasant) Farms (March 
1994) stipulated that citizen applying for land must be able-bodied and above 18 and have 
adequate farming skills. Land was to be allocated primarily to rural people residing on the 
territory of former collective and state farms (which were required by law to reorganize into 
so-called daikhan berleshik, or peasant associations).  
Article 1 of the Law on Daikhan (Peasant) Farms defines a peasant (daikhan) farm as 
a family-based unit engaged in commercial agricultural production using mostly family 
labor. Article 8 stipulates that the land for daikhan farming can be allocated in inheritable 
possession, private ownership, or lease, the exact form of tenure being at the discretion of 
the local authorities. A peasant farm is free to determine its organization, production, and 
sales. However, it is obligated to use the land strictly in accordance with the prescribed 
purposes, while carrying out soil improvement work and protecting the land from erosion 
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  1and ecological deterioration. A farmer may lose his ownership rights if the land has 
remained fallow for two years; if it was not used for the prescribed purposes; or if 
irresponsible cultivation methods led to soil degradation.  
These restrictions on land use in peasant farms did not deter the rural residents and 
many applied and actually received an allocation of land for independent private farming. 
Indeed, for the first three years after the decree (1993-1996) new private farms were 
established on 98.5 thousand hectares, which constitutes only 0.3% of agricultural land in 
Turkmenistan, but fully 93% of land given until now in private ownership. The growth of 
private farming abated after this initial burst, and in 1996-2000 the area distributed for 
private farming increased by only 0.7 thousand hectares (Lerman and Stanchin 2003).  
This paper discusses peasant farms in Turkmenistan. It is based on a survey 
conducted in 2000 on a sample of 143 new private farmers from five administrative regions 
(velayats). The survey provides farm-level information about resources, assets, activities, 
and achievements as well as about the demographic profiles of the farmers’ families. In 
analyzing this information, we expect the success of the farmers to be affected by their 
initial financial and social resources, i.e., their “capitals”. Thus, the most successful ones 
could be those who started in the most favorable conditions: with better skills, higher social 
status and more money. The study addresses two specific questions: (1) how the former 
status of the private farmers (their “position”) affected what they initially received; and (2) 
how connections, formal education, and special skills implied in the farmers’ “positions” 
affected their subsequent success. 
Each farmer possesses several kinds of capital: physical (material and financial 
resources), human (education, training, skills), and social (formal and informal ties). While 
physical capital is embodied in material form, human capital is less tangible, being 
embodied in the skills and knowledge acquired by an individual, and social capital is less 
tangible yet, as it is expressed in relations among persons (Coleman 2000). All three types 
of capital are likely to contribute to productivity, and the survey provides information on 
the physical and human capital of peasant farmers in Turkmenistan and to some extent on 
the social capital implied in the positions of the farmers. 
The survey distinguished five categories of farmers according to the position they 
held prior to establishing a peasant farm: managers, middle-level specialists, administrative 
staff, skilled workers, and unskilled workers. These positions represent different 
combinations of physical, human, and social capital, and we examine their effects on 
farming success.  
All positions imply some degree of knowledge, experience, and connections, as well 
as accumulation of or access to physical capital. People who held managerial positions in 
the past usually have extensive formal and informal links (social capital); most are well 
educated (human capital) though they may lack specialized agricultural skills and have no 
competence in specific production processes (especially those who came to private farming 
from industry, local government, and other non-agricultural sectors); they also are likely to 
have savings and assets (physical capital) by virtue of their relatively high earnings in the 
past.
2 Middle-level specialists were responsible for day-to-day management of production 
                                                 
2 Nikula (2001) called a leading position in the old structure organizational capital. It is important for 
successful entrepreneurship, as it provides financial resources and knowledge. He argued that top 
managers do not necessarily become private entrepreneurs. More likely are the lower managers with their 
specialized knowledge. Organizational capital as such is not a decisive factor, but personal contacts and 
  2in former collective and state farms. Their earnings were large enough to have some startup 
savings (physical capital), their position was high enough for useful connections (social 
capital), they are well educated, and they have practical experience and technological skills 
(human capital). They often assisted farm managers by carrying out basic business opera-
tions, such as negotiating credit and arranging sales. These managerial skills augmented 
their human capital. Middle-level specialists may combine technical competence and useful 
connections. They know many practically oriented people at the middle level. As 
professionals, they are always welcome in technocratic networks, unlike the rank-and-file 
workers. Middle-level specialists always know who to ask what. Administrative staff 
includes economists, accountants, and office workers. While all have professional 
education (human capital), their experience is primarily in paperwork, not farming. 
However, they have a better chance (than rank-and-file farm workers) to acquire useful 
friends at a high enough level (social capital). Their earnings, while lower than those of 
managers, were higher than those of farm workers and comparable with those of middle-
level specialists (physical capital). Skilled and unskilled workers had lower earnings and 
thus smaller savings (physical capital); they were less educated and did not acquire special 
managerial skills (human capital); they had less opportunity for developing connections 
(social capital). Workers may have practical experience as do others in their network, but 
their level may be too low to ensure effective blat. The difference between skilled and 
unskilled workers is mainly one of degree, with unskilled workers characterized by lower 
endowments of all three capitals.   
Managers clearly have the highest “capitals”, whereas workers are at the bottom of 
the ranking. We hypothesize that, taken separately, formal education, special skills, 
managerial experience, informal connections, and savings do not guarantee the best results 
in a private business, such as farming. Only a proper combination of “capitals” will ensure 
profitable operation. 
This paper is organized as follows. The introduction is followed by a section that 
presents the results of the survey analysis. Here we describe who the farmers are, where 
they live, why they have chosen to become farmers, what resources they have obtained 
from the powers that be, how they have deployed these resources, and what they have 




Who are the farmers surveyed? 
The farmers surveyed came to private farming from all sectors of the economy: agriculture 
(57%), industry (14%), services (9%) and other sectors (13%), and from positions at 
different levels (table 1). Unskilled workers came mainly from agriculture, while managers 
and administrative staff – from all sectors. The percentage of former managers of collective 
and state farms equals the percentage of former agricultural workers – skilled or unskilled 
(14%), though the managers constituted but a small proportion of the staff of agricultural 
enterprises. This may imply that selection committees favored people in leading positions, 
with better connections and deeper pockets; that former workers did not feel confident to 
apply for a farm of their own; or that farms run by managers have a higher survival rate. 
                                                                                                                                                     
capabilities are. The chances of an ordinary worker, lacking networks and skills, of setting up a profitable 
business are limited, or at least he would need to invest more efforts (Nikula 2001).  
  3The average age of the farmers is 48 years, and those who had higher former positions 
tend to be older (table 2). Average family size is 5.6 persons with insignificant differences 
between groups. Education varies with position. Managers and administrative workers are 
the most educated: ca. 90% reported higher education (table 2), as against 59% for the 
sample as a whole. At the other end of the continuum, among unskilled workers 21% had 
less than ten years of schooling. 
Most farmer families live in the village of the peasant association where the farm is 
located, but not on the farm itself (table 3). Former managers and administrative staff show 
a clear preference for actually living far from their farm – in other villages, in the etrap 
(district) center
3, or in a nearby city, perhaps because in this way they are closer to their 
off-farm jobs (see table 8). 
 
Table 1. Distribution of farmers by previous occupation (% of all respondents) 
Former position  Agriculture  Industry  Social in-
stitutions 
Local 
government  Other  Total 
Manager  14.0  6.3 4.9 3.5 2.1  30.8 
Middle-level specialist   24.5  6.3  2.1    2.8  35.7 
Administrative  staff  3.5 0.7 2.1 3.5 4.2  14.0 
Skilled worker  7.0  0.7      2.1  9.8 
Unskilled  worker  7.7      2.1  9.8 
Total  56.6  14.0 9.1  7.0 13.3  100.0 
 
Table 2. The average age, family size and education of farmers  
Education (% of respondents in each category) 














Manager 51  5.4  88.6  11.4     
Middle-level  specialist 47  5.4  47.1 35.3 13.7  3.9 
Administrative  staff  50  5.9 90.0 5.0    5.0 
Skilled  worker  45  5.2  14.3 28.6 50.0  7.1 
Unskilled worker  41  4.9  7.1    71.4  21.5 
Total  48  5.6  58.7 19.6 16.8  4.9 
 
Table 3. Where the farmer’s family lives (% of families within each category). 
Former position  On the farm 
In the village, 





center  Other 
Manager  11.4 43.2  6.8 34.1 4.5 
Middle-level specialist  11.8 58.8  9.8 15.7 3.9 
Administrative staff   60.0  10.0  30.0   
Skilled worker  14.3 71.4    14.3   
Unskilled worker  21.4  78.6     
Total  11.2 57.3  7.0 21.7 2.8 
                                                 
3 Administratively, Turkmenistan is divided into five velayats (provinces, former Soviet oblasts), which are in 
turn subdivided into etraps (regions, former Soviet raions). 
  4There are some [non significant] differences between categories in reasons for 
becoming a farmer. Thus, for skilled categories the main reasons were to secure their 
children’s future, followed by the hope to earn more. Unskilled workers complained the 
most about insufficient income in collective farms. Besides desiring to earn more, they 
were eager to work without superiors (71% as against 56% in average). This is 
understandable after years of obedience coupled with the lowest pay level. Managers were 
more than others motivated by family prestige.  
 
What do they have? 
 
Land 
In their application forms future farmers indicated the desired size, location of the plot and 
planned agricultural activity. Then, the authorities decided whether to grant the request, or 
not. Land could be received in private ownership or leased. A private farmer can lease 
additional land from the local authorities. The proportion of farmers receiving land in 
private ownership and long-term lease varies by position. Among unskilled workers, the 
percent of owned plots is the smallest, perhaps because the authorities do not believe in 
such farmers or because unskilled applicants are more cautious and less ambitious than the 
others (table 5). Total plot size was determined by the etrap level State committee on land 
reform. It depended on the availability of land and water and on the labor capacity of the 
applicant’s family. Payment was collected as annual land tax, determined by land quality, 
location and availability of water for the plot. Farm size ranges from 1 to 370 hectares, 
averaging 19 ha for owned farms and 39 ha for leased farms. 88% of the plots do not 
exceed 50 hectares, the legal limit. There is no significant difference in plot size among 
farmer categories, but table 6 shows that middle-level specialists received the largest plots, 
twice the average for skilled workers. This may be because the former were assumed to 
have skills and experience in farm management. 
 
Table 4. Plot size (ha), land quality (% of land of each quality group in the plot), land property, and perceived 
security of tenure (% of respondents within each group). 
Land quality*  Land property  Perceived security of 
tenure  Former position  Plot 
size, ha 
1 2 3  owned leased  yes  no  don’t 
know 
Manager  34.8 19.0 14.5 66.5 52.3 47.7 77.3  4.5  18.2 
Middle-level  specialist  36.3 41.2 28.6 30.2 37.3 62.7 76.5    23.5 
Administrative  staff  21.8 16.1 10.6 73.4 40.0 60.0 95.0    5.0 
Skilled  worker  17.8 38.2  6.8  55.0 57.1 42.9 92.9    7.1 
Unskilled  worker  25.9 9.1 32.2  58.7  14.3  85.7  64.3 7.1 28.6 
Total  31.0 22.0 20.2 57.8 42.0 58.0 79.7  2.1  18.2 
*Land quality classification: 
1 – irrigated land prepared for cultivation; 
2 – land prepared for irrigation, but requiring improvement; 
3 – virgin land. 
 
Land was classified into three categories: good quality irrigated land ready for 
cultivation; land with irrigation, but requiring improvement; and unprepared virgin land. 
Middle-level specialists and skilled workers received the best land, probably because they 
  5were good judges of land quality. Managers and administrative staff, however, ended up 
with the worst land (table 4). In spite of an optimistic attitude to land quality (about 80% of 
respondents were satisfied with the land received), only half the respondents cultivated 
their entire holding. In general, private farmers are confident of keeping their land (table 4). 
The most pessimistic are the unskilled workers, while the administrative staff is the most 
confident of the permanence of their tenure. 
The Law on Daikhan (Peasant) Farms promises that the state will protect the rights of 
private farmers and state investment. It also promises that the state will help them develop 
new land and improve irrigation
4. However, only 32% of the farmers received a budget for 
land improvement, averaging 4.2 million manats
5 per farm, which is $830 at the official 
rate and about $200 at the black market rate. Again, former unskilled workers were 
forgotten (none received any attention from the state). Meanwhile more than half the 
administrative staff (55%) received state assistance for their land improvement, while 
middle-level specialists received the largest state help. 
 
Water 
According to the Law on Daikhan (Peasant) Farms, the state supports private farms, 
providing them with water for irrigation, for production needs and household consumption. 
All private farms have access to an external irrigation network, wells, rivers, or at least to 
local water sources such as highly mineralized ground water and contaminated drainage 
lakes. However, only 20% report receiving it on time and even then much less than 
required. The distribution of water sources between farms differs by former positions of 
their owners (table 5). Thus, managers, middle-level specialists, and administrative staff 
have good access to the man-made irrigation network, while former unskilled workers are 
forced to rely on natural water sources (e.g., rivers, lakes, and wells). The difference in 
water sources may mean different water quality and eventually may affect yields. 
 
Table 5. State land improvement plan, water sources, and financial ability (% of respondents in each group). 
State land improvement 
plan  Water sources 
Former position 
% of res-








Manager  38.6 3.55 29.5 63.6  6.8  31.8 
Middle-level  specialist  27.5 7.31 29.4 64.7  5.9  17.6 
Administrative  staff  55.0 1.89    90.0 10.0 15.0 
Skilled  worker  28.6 1.75 35.7 50.0 14.3  7.1 
Unskilled  worker      64.3 21.4 14.3  0.0 
Total  32.2 4.24 29.4 62.2  8.4  19.0 
 
                                                 
4 Waiting for help was naïve. By 1999 the share of agriculture in state investments had been cut to 2% 
(Pomfret 2001). 
5 The national currency, the manat, was introduced in November 1993with the initial rate $0.5 for 1 manat. 
The currency depreciated rapidly. In April 1998, the currency was pegged at 5200 manat per dollar, close to 
the then prevailing market rate. Since then the government has maintained the official rate despite strong 
excess demand for foreign currency. The parallel (free market) exchange rate fell precipitously to over three 
times the official rate by mid 1999 and to four times the official rate by late 2000. 
  6Other resources 
Allocation of land is a prerequisite for starting a peasant farm. In addition to land, farmers 
may receive other production assets from the peasant association, such as livestock or 
machinery, based on their seniority and cumulative salary. Among the farmers surveyed, 
only managers and middle-level specialists report receiving any additional assets on leaving 
the association. Thus, 2% of the managers and 6% of the middle-level specialists left the 
peasant association with some livestock; 2% of the managers received some machinery on 
exit. None of the respondents in other categories received anything other than land.  
The last column in table 5 shows farmers’ statements about their ability to buy 
additional resources. Unsurprisingly managers could save – almost one third reported being 
able to buy inputs. Half that proportion of middle-level specialists and administrative staff 
could purchase necessary farm inputs, while none of the unskilled workers could. This 
appears congruent with the former salary hierarchy between farmers. 
 
Credit 
Banking for agriculture in general and private farmers in particular is the monopoly of the 
state-controlled Daikhan Bank. Private farmers are allowed to hold individual accounts and 
conduct financial transactions with the Daikhan Bank only. Credit to farmers is provided 
exclusively through special government programs administered by the Daikhan Bank
6. 85% 
of the farmers surveyed have a bank account. However, active borrowing is extremely 
limited among private farmers, partly because Turkmenistan is a “cash economy” and many 
are unfamiliar with the banking system. Even when given an opportunity to obtain highly 
subsidized credit, many do not know how to apply, the rest lack collateral, and some may 
be unsure of being able to pay back, despite negative real interest rates.   
 
Table 6. Credit and loans obtained (% of respondents, average sum, term and interest rate) 
Former position  % of farmers 
Average loan 
amount,       thou. 
manat 
Term, years  Interest rate, % 
Manager 11.4  55040  0-5  0-15 
Middle-level specialist  11.8  26883  1  0-36 
Administrative staff         
Skilled workers  14.3  6000  5  0-20 
Unskilled workers         
Total 9.1  34500  0-5  0-36 
 
Nearly two-thirds of the respondents indicated that they were unable to get any credit. As 
main reasons they mentioned the technical complexity of the loan-application system and 
their inability to provide satisfactory collateral. The few farmers who report actual 
                                                 
6 Funding for investment and working capital is provided to private farmers through government programs 
characterized by deeply negative real interest rates and high levels of credit targeting. Those accepting 
state orders for wheat and cotton receive credit against the future harvest at 1% interest rate (while 
inflation averaged 21% in 1998-99, after subsiding from more than 1000% annually in 1993-1995). These 
credits are added to the 50% input subsidy covering 35% of wheat production costs and 25% of cotton 
production costs (Lerman and Stanchin 2003). Private farmers and other producers operating without state 
orders are also entitled to subsidized credit, but have to pay 8-10% nominal interest rates (Presidential 
decree No. 3626, March 4, 1998), which are still deeply negative in real terms. 
  7borrowing in 1999 (9.1% of all respondents) received loans from both formal and informal 
sources (table 6). The average loan from banks (44 million manat) is twice as large as the 
average value of sales in 1999 (21 million manat). Credits and loans were only reported by 
managers, middle-level specialists and skilled workers (table 6). Despite the high 
percentage of unskilled workers having a bank account, none received credit. 
 
Amenities 
Infrastructures are underdeveloped in rural Turkmenistan. This is true for roads which are 
both amenities and production facilities, and also true for electricity and even gas, despite 
its abundance in the country. More than two thirds of the private farms lack them (table 7). 
Agronomists, engineers and other specialists reported much better equipped farms. Running 
water is a privilege of middle-level specialists and managers. Former administrative staff 
had no gas on their farms and 90% had no electricity either. However, facilities and 
infrastructure may not be so important to them as only 30% work full-time on the farm and 
none live on it.  
 
Table 7. “Amenities” (% of farms within each category). 
Former position 
No water, 
no electricity, no 
gas 
Running 
water  Gas Electricity  Access    roads
Manager 70.5  4.6  9.1 29.5  50.0 
Middle-level specialist  54.9  7.9  21.6  43.1  49.0 
Administrative staff  90.0      10.0  35.0 
Skilled worker  71.4    7.1  28.6  50.0 
Unskilled worker  78.6    7.1  21.4  50.0 
Total  68.5 4.2  11.9  30.8  47.6 
 
What do they do? 
 
Labor 
Private farms mostly employ personal or family labor. Others can be hired, on a contract 
basis. Farmer contribution to farm labor is measured in terms of the number of persons 
providing full-time or part-time work. While 72% of the farmers work off farm, 58% of the 
respondents with off-farm jobs identified themselves as full-time farmers (table 8).  
 
Table 8. Work on the farm and off-farm job, % of respondents 
Former position  Farmers with 
off-farm job 
Full time – farm 
only 





Manager  86.4 13.6 27.3 59.1 
Middle-level  specialist  62.7 37.3 29.4 33.3 
Administrative  staff  70.0  30.0 5.0 65.0 
Skilled  worker  78.6 21.4 50.0 28.6 
Unskilled  worker  57.1 42.9 50.0  7.1 
Total  72.0 28.0 29.4 42.7 
 
  8Farm income is thus only one component of the family budget. Administrative staff 
members were the least willing to farm themselves (only one third reported full-time work 
on the farm): maybe because none live on the farm and they are unfamiliar with agriculture, 
or because physical work is hard for them. The smallest share of farmers combining farm 
and off-farm work, and thus the largest share of those devoting their full time to farming, is 
among middle-level specialists and unskilled workers. The former may have trusted their 
skills and experience, while the latter may have felt that they had little lose by leaving their 
low-paid jobs. Indeed both categories were the most eager to earn more (as a motive for 
becoming a private farmer). 
 
Farm specialization 
Practically all peasant farmers engage in crop production (table 9). According to the law, 
private farms have the right to decide what to grow. However, cotton cannot be grown 
without irrigation, whereas many private farms established on virgin land suffer from water 
shortage. About 80% of the farmers grow wheat (table 10), though it is much less profitable 
than cotton. The most diversified production is on the farms of former managers, while 
unskilled workers grow only wheat, cotton or both at the expense of other crops and of 
livestock. Cotton requires the larger number of workers per hectare, which may be, along 
with insufficient irrigation, a barrier to adopting cotton in family-based private farms. 
Choice of wheat can be explained by two strategies: (1) for better-off farmers with a well-
paid outside job wheat might be a convenient crop, not requiring much time, water and 
other care; (2) for poor farmers with insecure status growing wheat may help to avoid risk 
due to lower production costs and less variability of wheat yields compared to cotton. 
Livestock is reported by 
less than 30% of respondents. 
The farmers’ reasons for avoid-
ing its production are comp-
laints about lack of everything – 
funds, stables, fodder, and 
experience. On the average, the 
herd is largest on the farms of 
middle-level agricultural specia-
lists (68 heads including 22 
cows) and smallest on the farms 
of skilled workers from non-
agricultural enterprises (5 heads including 2 cows). 
 
Table 10. Crop specialization (% of farmers of each group growing the crop) 






Manager  84.1 15.9 11.4 20.5 25.0  4.5 
Middle-level  specialist  82.4 37.3 17.7 17.6 27.5  2.0 
Administrative  staff  70.0 30.0 10.0 30.0 15.0   
Skilled worker  57.1  42.9  14.3  7.1  21.4  7.1 
Unskilled worker  92.9  57.1         
Total  79.0 32.2 12.6 17.5 21.0  2.8 
Table 9. Specialization profile of peasant farmers 
(% of respondents within each category) 
Former position  Plant 
growing  Livestock  Livestock 
and crops 
Manager  60.5 9.3 30.2 
Middle-level specialist  72.5 2.0 25.5 
Administrative staff  80.0 5.0 15.0 
Skilled worker  71.4  28.6 
Unskilled worker  100.0    
Total  72.6 4.2 23.2 
  9What do they achieve? 
 
Farm performance could be assessed using data on profits from the survey. Private farms 
are profitable. In 1999, the average farm had a gross profit of $2,110 at the official 
exchange rate ($610 at the free-market rate), about 52% of sales. The profitability of private 
farms is remarkable in view of government controls that keep producer prices below world 
market prices
7. While only 37% of middle-level specialists reported using their entire land 
holding, their total revenue from farm sales is the largest, twice that of the unskilled 
workers (however, inter-group differences are not significant). Administrative staff 
members make the highest profit per hectare (table 11), though they were in the worst 
situation with respect to water supply (only 5% receive it on time).  
Farm specialization considerably affects economic performance of the farm (table 12). 
Mixed farms (producing both crops and livestock) appear to be the most profitable (by total 
profit) and the most productive (by profit per hectare).  
 
Table 11.  Financial performance of the farms, thousand manats. 
Former position  Total revenue Total cost   Profit  Cost to 
revenue ratio  Profit per 1 ha
Manager  18939 10023  8916  0.62 441 
Middle-level specialist  24546 11169 13377  0.58 707 
Administrative staff  22051 9403 12647 0.48 1244 
Skilled worker  21661 10817 10844  0.81 653 
Unskilled worker  12912 5932  6980  0.50 580 
Total  21010 10002 11008  0.59  684 
 
Table 12. Financial performance of farms with different specialization, thousand manats. 
Farm specialization  Total revenue Total cost   Profit  Cost to 
revenue ratio  Profit per 1 ha
Plant growing  16042 7605  8438  0.58  613 
Livestock   31742 15060 16682  0.45  627 
Mixed (crops + livestock)  33338 15966 17372  0.64  884 
Total  21010 10002 11008  0.59  684 
 
Profit as a function of human and physical 
capital 
 
Contrary to expectations, the profit 
performance in Table 11 does not increase 
with capital endowment. We accordingly 
examined in some detail the relation of 
profit to human and physical capital. 
Human capital variables in the survey 
include years of schooling (as reported by 
the respondents) and agricultural 
Table 13. The aggregate capital scores 




Manager  17.0 3.1 
Middle-level specialist   16.5 3.4 
Administrative staff  15.7 1.3 
Skilled worker  14.9 1.3 
Unskilled worker  13.9 1.3 
Total  16.1 2.6 
                                                 
7 The producer price for wheat in March 1999 was $25 per ton at the curb exchange rate. The cotton price was 
about $95 per ton, which corresponds to $285 fiber equivalent. The export price for cotton fiber f.o.b. at the 
Turkmen border is approximately $1,550 per ton (Lerman and Brooks 2003). 
  10experience (arbitrarily set at 5 years for respondents who previously worked in agriculture). 
Managerial ability is also an important component of human capital, but is not reported in 
the questionnaire and thus cannot be included in our analysis. The two reported components 
of human capital were summed to produce an aggregate human capital score (table 13). 
Physical capital variables in the survey include plots size adjusted for quality (hectares 
multiplied by land quality score on a scale of 1 (bad) to 3 (good); see Table 4), financial 
ability to buy additional resources (0 or 2), and farm machinery (in units owned). These 
variables were summed to produce an aggregate physical capital score (table 13).  
It should be noted that we consider farmers’ human and physical capital and farm 
performance at different moments of time. We look at human capital and positions at the 
moment of becoming a farmer, and measure physical capital and profit 2-8 years later, at 
the moment of the survey. Besides, by running the farm, the farmer accumulates practical 
farm management experience under the new conditions, and thus a form of human capital 
which may have considerable practical value, in contrast with soviet type agricultural 
experience, with its extreme specialization, which may have become obsolete. 
Two regression models were run (table 14). The first regressed farm profit on the 
detailed capital variables and farm labor. In the second model, the five capital variables 
were regressed on the two aggregated scores for human and physical capital, keeping labor 
as the third independent variable. In Model 1, the estimated coefficients of labor, land 
adjusted for quality, and financial resources are statistically significant, while schooling 
and agricultural past and number of units of own machinery are not. Model 2 produces 
similar results: labor and the aggregated physical capital index are statistically significant, 
while the aggregated human capital index is not.  
 
Table 14. Regression models: The impact of human and physical capital on profit. 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variable Coefficient  Significance  Variable Coefficient  Significance 
(Constant) -5123.5  0.575  (Constant)  -1799.7  0.826 
Years of schooling  212.2  0.732  Human capital  100.9  0.835 
Agricultural past  988.3  0.726  Physical capital  1736.8  0.000 
Land 79.2  0.000  Labor  1553.1  0.001 
Financial ability  7603.3  0.031       
Units of machinery  538.6  0.361       
Labor 1502.8  0.002       
Adjusted R
2   0.317  Adjusted  R
2 0.274 
 
Since education is the main part in our estimate of human capital, and we cannot 
know the profile of education farmers got, we can say that just level of education does not 
improve the farm performance. This is consistent with the results of Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger (1993) indicating that even in relatively developed LDCs (India) schooling 
does not affect farm profit. The second part of out estimate of human capital is work at the 
agricultural enterprises. It appears that most of the farmers who worked in agriculture in 
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The study showed dissimilarities in both the initial endowment of the farms established by 
persons with different occupational pasts and the achievements of those farms. We 
expected managers and middle-level specialists to be the most successful. We also expected 
administrative personnel lacking any practical agricultural experience to be unsuccessful. 
And we did not expect skilled and especially unskilled workers to do very well. 
Managers “disappointed” us. Having better initial conditions for running private 
farms and possessing more physical, human and social capital than other categories of 
farmers, they nevertheless showed the worst performance (18% of farms are unprofitable, 
and the rest – far from outstanding). There can be several explanations. (1) For many 
managers a farm is not a necessity, but rather a matter of prestige. Indeed more managers 
than members of other categories reported prestige as motive for becoming farmers. 
Besides, 86% of them still have a paid (or even well paid) off-farm job, which might be 
their main source of income. Therefore, they are less concerned with farm profitability. (2) 
Influential household heads may use their positions to promote younger members of the 
family, get land for them and leave them to deal with the practicalities. (3) If farm 
managers are not only official owners, but also participate in production, they may lack 
practical experience, special skills and for some – agricultural knowledge. Thus, while their 
farms have better equipment, more credit and more diversification than others, their 
operation is less profitable. 
In contrast, administrative personnel having similar office character of job and level 
of education worked wonders. Only a quarter of them came from agriculture, in comparison 
to half the managers with agricultural past; they got the worst land, only 5% received water 
on time, only one third worked on their farms full time and none of their families lived 
there, no farms were provided with running water and gas. Nevertheless, they could avoid 
losses on their farms and showed the highest profit per hectare, lowest cost/revenue ratio. 
Besides, they could manage the best irrigation in the sample (90% of farms had irrigation 
network compared with 21-65% in other farmers’ categories) and more than half received 
governmental help through the “complex land arrangement plan”. Whether this was 
accomplished through their superior bureaucratic skills or because of their connections with 
bureaucrats in other offices is anybody’s guess. 
Middle-level agricultural specialists (agronomist, engineer, etc) represent most of 
those who have managerial skills and education. Along with a good level of schooling 
(mostly higher, vocational, and technical), two thirds have agricultural background. This 
probably allowed them to get the best land in the sample, and good irrigation conditions. 
They diversify farm activities showing the highest profit per farm. 
Skilled workers are in a moderate position – in terms of both what they received and 
what they achieved. Unskilled workers showed the most modest achievements, lacking 
capital and consequently evincing risk aversion. They cannot afford to buy inputs, to breed 
expensive livestock, to get loans. The state gave them bad land mostly in lease and “forgot” 
them while designing the complex land improvement plan. 80% of their farms have no 
access to the irrigation network. Unskilled workers only grow cash crops on the farm – 
wheat and cotton and presumably devote the household plot to subsistence. It may also be 
that livestock production, though more profitable than plant growing, requires larger 
investments, which former unskilled workers cannot afford. Not having livestock allows 
them to reduce production costs and do without credits and loans. These farmers devote 
  12more than the others family labor to the farm, instead of hiring people or keeping low-paid 
off farm job. Profit per hectare on their farms is small, but costs are also small. 
Explaining the difference in farm performance by differences in previous positions 
may be insufficient. For example, what makes the performance of managers and 
administrative staff so different? It cannot be explained by human capital theory, which 
often assumes that a person’s socioeconomic status is only limited by his or her formal 
education: that people with more schooling are always more productive than those having 
less of it. A fuller picture would encompass differences in family size, earner-dependent 
ratios, and the role of the private household plot. Moreover, previous position may not 
reflect present social status. In the time elapsed since the respondents became private 
farmers, things could have changed, especially among people with leading positions. 
Besides, the household head is not necessarily the one running the farm. He might give the 
farm to grown up children to manage production. 
In our analysis we use socio-economic characteristics of the official owner, because 
the statuses of children tend to be strongly correlated to those of their parents. Thus, 
children of highly educated parents tend to have more years of schooling than children of 
less highly-educated parents (Becker 1993). Similarly, children tend to inherit their parents’ 
capital assets, or even receive wealth transfers while the parents are still alive. Parents also 




The farmers came from all sectors of economy, although more than half had previously 
worked in agriculture. Those deciding to become private farmers are motivated first and 
foremost by hopes for their children’s future, prospects of higher earnings, and the 
opportunity to work independently. 
The study correlated the performance of private farms to operator social status, 
defined as previous occupational position. The survey showed that middle-level specialists 
were the “most appropriate” candidates for private farming. They have the largest plots 
with the best land quality, and the best equipped farms. Their agricultural experience told 
them which land was best, and allowed them to ask for it, and diversify production – i.e. 
add livestock to plant growing. Some managerial skills helped them perform farm business 
operations, including obtaining credit, purchasing inputs and arranging sales. They also 
brought some startup capital saved on previous jobs and were successful financially. 
We have shown that socio-economic characteristics of the farmer are affecting farm 
productivity only indirectly, through physical capital. Land and financial ability 
(components of variable ‘physical capital’) matter to successful farming, while farmer’s 
formal education, agricultural experience, positions (social status) and useful connections 
serve mainly as means towards acquiring them – “good” education helps get a “good” 
position, which in turn helps get “good” friends and earn more money, which can serve as 
start up capital. In addition, labor quality seems immaterial and only quantity counts. 
Human capital, or at least what we have been able to measure of it, appears 
unimportant for successful farming for three reasons: (1) education acquired may have 
become obsolete or irrelevant to the new situation; (2) as it has been shown that in 
developing countries where agriculture is simple, only the first years of schooling actually 
do matter; (3) our results are tentative. Unfortunately, the questionnaire provides no details 
about field of education – thus, people with knowledge in soil sciences, agronomy, and 
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veterinary science might be more successful in farming than experts in nineteenth century 
Russian poetry. 
As far as social capital is concerned – the questionnaire was not designed to study it, 
and indeed as shown in the case of the administrator’s better ability to receive government 
assistance, we can hardly isolate its effects. Further research is needed to assess the exact 
contribution of different forms of capital to farm performance. 
Curiously, the socialist past affects not only the resources the new farmers receive but 
also how they use them. This may be due to the limited amount of structural change that 
Turkmenistan has undergone since independence. Thus it would be interesting to find out 
whether our findings would hold in countries where reforms have been more sweeping. 
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